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Abstract
The paper explores the relationship between job ﬂo w sa n dw a g e si nt h eU . S .m a n -
ufacturing sector, where wage diﬀerentials for seemingly identical workers and job
reallocation rates are shown to be negatively correlated across 3-digit industries. High
wage industries have the lowest turnover of jobs, oﬀe r i n gm o r es e c u r ee m p l o y m e n t
opportunities. In a regression of wage diﬀerentials on industry characteristics, the
role of job ﬂows is robust to the inclusion of many variables that typically help ex-
plain the wage structure. However, average education in a worker’s industry, ﬁrm size,
and capital-per-employee jointly render the coeﬃcient on industry job ﬂows low and
insigniﬁcant.
To explain these ﬁndings, an inter-sectoral equilibrium model of the labor market
with endogenous job destruction is developed. Employer-provided training in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc skills provides the necessary mechanism that increases wages when job ﬂows
are low, due to the dependence of training investments on expected job duration and
through exogenous diﬀerences in skill requirements. The role of average education
can then be explained by a complementarity between training and observable ex-ante
abilities of workers, so that average education in the regression proxies for the average
amount of training that workers receive in an industry.
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11 Introduction
The empirical ﬁndings on job reallocation (or job ﬂows)h a v ea ﬀected both macro- and labor
economics in fundamental ways. In macroeconomics, evidence on the simultaneous creation
and destruction of jobs forced researchers to acknowledge the heterogeneity of individual
outcomes and to investigate its implications for the business cycle and growth. In labor
economics, the ﬁndings have spurred the development of the ﬂows approach to the labor
market and brought equilibrium unemployment theory to a prominent position.
One particular set of ﬁndings concerns the variation in job ﬂow rates across industries.
For the U.S. manufacturing sector, Davis and Haltiwanger have established that both gross
job creation and gross job destruction rates diﬀer strongly across industries, each ranging
b e t w e e n6a n d1 4p e r c e n t . 1 These rates are highly correlated: industries with low job
destruction rates also have low job creation rates, which is reﬂected in the relatively low net
growth rates of employment, on average -1.1 percent in manufacturing. Furthermore, job
ﬂows fall with the size and age of ﬁrms.2
Surprisingly, there have been no explicit attempts to explore the relationship between the
variation across industries in job reallocation intensities and the well-known inter-industry
wage diﬀerentials. This is the topic of the paper. Using data from various sources both at
the individual and aggregate levels, it documents a strong negative correlation between job
ﬂows and wages across 55 U.S. manufacturing industries, which persists even after controlling
for observed worker characteristics.3 In other words, the central ﬁnding is that high wage
industries have the lowest turnover of jobs, oﬀe r i n gm o r es e c u r ee m p l o y m e n to p p o r t u n i t i e s .
At ﬁrst glance, this ﬁnding is puzzling since less attractive jobs should command higher wages
in a competitive labor market. However, it is easily conceivable that the correlation arises
because many of the factors that appear to cause industry wage diﬀerentials are inversely
related to the magnitude of job ﬂows. For example, high barriers to entry in a sector should
be associated with low job reallocation rates as well as high proﬁts-per-employee. With
rent-sharing, wages will be high as well.
The paper addresses two questions. The ﬁrst is whether the correlation is robust to
the inclusion of industry characteristics that typically help explain the inter-industry wage
structure. Regressing inter-industry wage diﬀerentials on industry characteristics shows that
the partial correlation across industries between job ﬂows and wage diﬀerentials is robust to
including, individually, measures of average ﬁrm size, proﬁts-per-employee, capital intensity,
unionization, and average education of the workforce in an industry. Controlling jointly for
ﬁrm size, capital intensity, and average education is suﬃcient to render the coeﬃcient on job
1References for the ﬁndings on job reallocation are, for example, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), and
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
2Industries also diﬀer in the cyclicality of job reallocation, with durable goods industries showing larger
swings in net and gross employment changes, while non-durable industries are less cyclical.
3The dataset combines the U.S. Current Population Survey, the NBER Productivity Database, and job
ﬂows statistics from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, which are based on the Longitudinal Research Database.
The combined data set has 55 manufacturing industries, mostly at the 3-digit CIC level and covers the years
1975 to 1987. Details follow in Section 3.
2ﬂows both low and insigniﬁcant. The second question to be addressed is how these ﬁndings
can be interpreted theoretically in a model with search and matching in the labor market
and endogenous job ﬂows.
Simulations of the calibrated labor market model show that the negative partial correla-
tion across industries between job ﬂows and wages cannot be generated without a mechanism
that drives up the wage whenever job ﬂows are low, thus oﬀsetting compensating diﬀerentials
for lower job security. It is shown that employer-provided training in ﬁrm-speciﬁch u m a n
capital oﬀers such a mechanism. One possibility are of course exogenous diﬀerences in skill
requirements. This explains part of the correlation. But the model highlights a second,
quantitatively important mechanism based on variations in the expected duration of jobs,
which is brought about by industry diﬀerences in sunk entry or job creation costs. Employers
endogenously respond to the higher potential duration of employment relationships with the
training they provide for newly hired workers. In the model, training translates into wages
through bilateral bargaining between worker and ﬁrm.
The hypothesis that training in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills is central to the negative correlation
between job ﬂows and wages is in fact supported by the role of capital-intensity, ﬁrm size, and
average education in the regressions mentioned above. Variation in capital-intensity is likely
to go along with diﬀerences in exogenous skill requirements, as more complex machinery
needs a better trained workforce, while larger ﬁr m st e n dt oh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et op r o v i d e
training due to their ability to oﬀer long-run employment relationships, as suggested by
Idson (1996).
The eﬀect of average education in the empirical investigation suggests a more complex
interaction between job ﬂows, training, and ability diﬀerences present in the labor market.
If one assumes, following Neal (1998), that training and ability are complements in the sense
that workers with better education and other ex-ante skills can be more eﬀectively trained,
then those sectors that oﬀer more training will employ better workers. This explains why
average education in an industry signiﬁcantly enters in a regression that already controls
for education at the individual worker’s level.4 Rather than reﬂecting the direct eﬀect of
education, it proxies for the additional reward educated workers get in sectors with more
training. This is corroborated by the ﬁndings in Black and Lynch (1995), that “employers
who have made large investments in physical capital relative to the number of workers or
who have hired workers with higher average education are more likely to train workers within
their establishments”. These authors in fact conclude that “this suggests that employer-
provided training is a complement rather than a substitute to investments in physical and
human capital”. In actual labor markets, these eﬀects would be ampliﬁed if ﬁrms with more
training search more intensively to improve match quality and to ﬁnd the appropriate skills,
which further increases wages.
The results thus emphasize the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital in the gener-
ation of wage diﬀerentials. Furthermore, they suggest an important role of expected job
4As such, this ﬁnding has been documented before, for example by Dickens and Katz (1987), but not in
connection with job ﬂows.
3duration, a factor typically ignored in models of equilibrium unemployment. This may be a
shortcoming since these models are frequently used in the analysis of labor market institu-
tions, which are likely to aﬀect match and job duration.
The framework used in the theoretical analysis is a search and matching model with en-
dogenous job ﬂows and wage bargaining, similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). There
are notable innovations, however. First of all, the model allows for structural heterogeneity
across industries in addition to the stochastic heterogeneity that drives gross job realloca-
tion within industries. Equilibrium across industries obtains through worker mobility, which
equalizes returns to search across sectors. Second, ﬁrms face a continuous choice as to how
much ﬁrm-speciﬁc training to provide to newly hired workers. This makes explicit the eﬀect
of expected job duration on training investments. Third, sunk job creation (or entry) costs
are incurred ex-ante, before a match takes place. Match-related sunk costs would directly
enter wage bargaining, whereas ex-ante job creation costs merely indirectly aﬀect wages be-
cause of the time-consuming (replacement) search if negotiations with a worker break down.
It is thus possible to identify the eﬀects of a variation in sunk job creation costs without let-
ting them a priori enter wage bargaining. This distinguishes conceptually job creation costs
from match creation costs. A ﬁnal, technical, innovation of the model is that it combines
equilibrium unemployment theory with the real options approach to investment decisions,
with uncertainty following a diﬀusion process. Even though the equilibrium still needs to be
simulated numerically, this allows a transparent and simple characterization the mechanisms
at work, in spite of the complexity of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief
survey of related studies. Section 3 introduces the data and the econometric methodology
employed and presents the empirical analysis. The model is developed and analyzed in Sec-
tion 4, while Section 5 presents the results of the numerical simulations. Section 6 concludes.
An appendix describes the data sources and provides further details on the model solution.
2 Related studies
The only study I know of which explicitly investigates the role of job reallocation for wages is
by Belzil (2000). Using longitudinal matched worker-ﬁrm data from Denmark, he ﬁnds that
plant-level net job creation increases wages for male workers at all phases of the business
cycle. This is particularly the case for wages of new entrants and of low-tenure workers. He
also ﬁnds that “the eﬀects of net job creation seem independent from worker characteristics,
such as education and experience.” Concerning the reallocation of workers, he ﬁnds that
wages at the plant level are positively correlated with changes in worker reallocation, indi-
cating the presence of compensating diﬀerentials. However, Belzil does not try to distinguish
potential explanations of these relationships.
The focus here is diﬀerent. Rather than looking at changes in wages due to net em-
ployment changes at the plant level, as Belzil does, I emphasize how average rates of gross
4employment changes relate to the average wage level in an industry in the long run.5 These
rates are best understood as a measure of the probability distribution of employment changes
that plants (and hence, their workers) face, rather than the actual changes that an individual
plant experiences. Thus the ﬁnding that plant-level wages rise with a plant’s net employment
growth has no implication for the long-run relationship between industry wage diﬀerentials
and (gross) job reallocation rates investigated here.
Two other studies more related to Belzil’s than to mine are by Dunne and Roberts (1990)
and Hamermesh (1993, chapter 4). Their focus is on the eﬀect of the risk of plant closing on
plant level wages. Using data on individual manufacturing plants in the U.S., Dunne and
Roberts establish that compensating diﬀerentials exist for the subset of ﬁrms that in the data
appear to face the risk of shutting down. Since the authors control for industry aﬃliation
and ﬁrm size, their results pertain to an intra-industry and intra-ﬁrm size class rather than
an inter-industry correlation between wages and job security. Hamermesh rationalizes these
ﬁndings theoretically.
Unfortunately, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, section 3.3) do not classify plants
by industry when they discuss the relationship between plant wage levels and job security.
They ﬁnd that “the magnitude of gross job ﬂows falls sharply with the relative level of
plant wages.[...] Stated diﬀerently, one year survival rates are much higher for jobs at high-
wage plants.”6 Their interpretation rests on the long-run attachment between workers and
ﬁrms that higher levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital create, which drives down job ﬂows.
However, they do not consider whether the causality may run from job duration to human
capital investments, as argued here, or whether the relationship also applies to the industry
variation of wages.7
The direct link between the duration of employment relationships and wages has been
investigated by Idson (1996), but only for worker turnover and across ﬁrm-size classes. Idson
gives an interpretation to his ﬁndings that is suggestive for the industry diﬀerences in job
ﬂows and wages considered here. He states that “lower [worker] turnover in large ﬁrms
results from the inherently greater capacity that large employers possess to develop long-term
relationships with their employees. This diﬀerential capacity stems from [...] lower failure
probabilities for large ﬁrms. In addition, the higher expected duration of the employment
relationships leads large ﬁrms and their employees to be more willing to invest in higher
levels of on-the-job training.”8 Of course, once such investments are present, employers have
an incentive to reduce worker turnover by hiring workers with a lower propensity to quit and
by oﬀering appropriate remuneration policies.
Finally, Abowd and Kramarz (2000) analyze longitudinal matched worker-ﬁrm data from
France and Washington State. They investigate whether ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates of unobserved
5These gross employment changes are in fact the sum of plant-level net expansions in an industry (that
is, gross job creation) and the sum of plant-level net contractions in an industry (gross job destruction).
6It should be noted that Davis et al. can only distinguish production and non-production workers. No
other worker characteristics are available in their data.
7See also Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), p.2753.
8Emphasis added. A second source Idson mentions is that large employers oﬀer more opportunities for
intra-ﬁrm career development and mobility.
5heterogeneity of ﬁrms and workers can account for the inter-industry wage diﬀerentials typi-
cally observed in cross-sectional data. For the U.S. sample, they ﬁnd that unobserved worker
ﬁxed eﬀects explain about half of inter-industry wage diﬀerentials and about 30 percent of
the ﬁr m - s i z ew a g ed i ﬀerential, while ﬁrm heterogeneity accounts for the remainder. Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of a plant’s survival probability on
wages. Since high survival rates of jobs are inversely related to industry-level job reallocation
rates, this is in line with the ﬁndings presented here.9
There are several variables that stand out as correlates of the industry wage structure,
which should be reported here. Dickens and Katz (1987) ﬁnd that wage diﬀerentials are
high in industries with high capital-to-labor ratios, high proﬁts-per-employee, with larger
establishments, and with high average education of workers.10 T h i si sb a s e do nn o n - m a t c h e d
data. With longitudinal matched data, Abowd et al. (1999) report that compensation
rises with the employment level of ﬁrms, capital-labor ratios and average education of the
workforce. Goux and Maurin (1999) conﬁrm that large, capital intensive, and more proﬁtable
ﬁrms tend to pay high wages. But note that while these factors are correlated with wages,
they do not fully account for the inter-industry wage variation so that an unexplained residual
remains, which job ﬂows may help account for.
3 Empirical evidence
Data
The data comes from various sources. In all regressions presented below, measures for job
reallocation are those in a dataset available from the Center of Economic Studies at the
U.S. Bureau of the Census.11 The data is for the U.S. manufacturing sector at the 4-digit
SIC level of disaggregation, covers the years 1973 to 1994, and contains job creation and
job destruction rates, and employment shares of each industry. From the job creation and
destruction rates one can calculate other measures of industry evolution, such as excess job
reallocation, gross job reallocation, and net employment changes. The available employment
shares allow easy aggregation to the 3- and 2-digit levels.
Deﬁnitions of the concepts used are as follows.12 Gross job creation is the sum of all
employment increases (from expanding plants or start-ups) in an industry between period t
and period t−1 (here, yearly data is used); gross job destruction is the sum of all employment
reductions (from contracting plants or shutdowns) in an industry in the same interval; gross
job reallocation is the sum of job creation and destruction. The term gross emphasizes
9Note that in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), which may be better known, the authors ascribe
most industry wage diﬀerences to unobserved heterogeneity of workers. The newer results are based on exact
estimation of unobserved worker and ﬁrm diﬀerences, while the 1999-paper uses an approximation procedure.
10See also Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988).
11These measures are constructed from the Longitudinal Research Database, which in turn are based on
the Annual Survey of Manufactures and the Census of Manufactures.
12These are well known from the literature on gross job ﬂows; see, again, Davis et al. (1996). Formal
deﬁntions are given in the appendix.
6that we are not looking at net changes of industry employment. Net employment growth
in an industry is simply given by job creation minus job destruction. The corresponding
rates are obtained by dividing by average employment in an industry between the points of
measurement.
Excess job reallocation is a more subtle statistic. Suppose a sector exhibits no job de-
struction but only job creation. The rate of job creation is both the net employment gain in
that sector and the job reallocation rate. This job reallocation rate is merely the turnover of
jobs necessary to accommodate net employment changes. In contrast, excess job reallocation
is deﬁned as job reallocation minus the absolute value of the net employment change. It thus
provides a measure of excess turbulence in a sector, ignoring net employment growth per
se. Of course, if a sector exhibits no employment growth, job reallocation and excess job
reallocation are the same.
The most straightforward measures for wages are contained in the NBER Productivity
Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). For the years 1973 to 1988, one ﬁnds total wage
payments, employment, and hours worked by 4-digit SIC industry. The same is available for
production workers alone. One can thus easily calculate wages per employee or per hour.
The drawback is that one cannot control for individual workers’ characteristics, and thus
not ascertain to what extent the results are true wage diﬀerentials rather than diﬀerences in
the composition of the workforce in each industry.
To construct a wage measure that controls for observable worker characteristics, I use
data from the Uniform March Files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). They cover the
years 1972 to 1988 and contain a host of individual controls, for example, age, race, gender,
year of education, occupation, and industry aﬃliation. Industry in the CPS is reported
at the 3-digit level of the CIC (Bureau of the Census) classiﬁcation, so that the measures
from the other sources have to be aggregated from the 4-digit SIC level and converted using
appropriate correspondence tables for the sectoral deﬁnitions.13
Other industry characteristics come from both the CPS and NBER. The May 1979 and
May 1983 supplements to the CPS contain data on the establishment-size class a worker is
employed in, his or her tenure, and whether he or she is covered by a union contract, all by
3-digit CIC industry, so that one can construct appropriate industry measures. One can also
calculate average education by industry. Unfortunately, the data from the May supplements
is only for two diﬀerent years, and is thus less precise. From the NBER dataset, one can
easily calculate an industry’s capital intensity and proﬁts-per-employee.14
From these measures a panel of industries is constructed which covers 55 manufacturing
industries over the years 1976 to 1988. While this would allow an analysis of the time series
characteristics of the data, this is not the focus here. The data from the May CPS could
13CIC stands for Census Industry classiﬁcation. Since some SIC industry deﬁnitions have no unambigu-
ous CIC counterpart, some sectors have to be dropped and others aggregated to a higher level where the
assignment is clear. Further complications arise since the CPS data uses the 1970 CIC codes up to 1982 and
the 1980 CIC codes from 1983. The detailed aggregation is given in the appendix.
14The measure of proﬁts-per-employee is calculated using a procedure suggested by Sanfey (1992) which
is given in the appendix.
7not be used then, and thus only long-run averages are compared. The main beneﬁto fd a t a
spanning several years is that it reduces measurement error and controls for the state of the
business cycle which is not possible with individual cross sections.
Econometric methodology
For any given year, the empirical model postulates an earnings equation of the form:
lnWi = Xiβ + ZJ(i)γ + ²i
where worker i’s log wage (average hourly earnings) is related to his or her personal charac-
teristics Xi and to the industry J(i)h eo rs h ei se m p l o y e di n .ZJ(i) is thus a vector of dummy
variables that indicate the workers’ industry, and β and γ are the corresponding coeﬃcient
vectors. The dummies capture the industry variation of wages not accounted for by the
observed individual characteristics. The error term ²i is i.i.d. across workers. The vector Xi
includes a typical set of controls.15 This equation is estimated for each of the available 13
years. The coeﬃcients on the industry dummies are translated into estimated inter-industry
wage diﬀerentials by deﬁning ωJ = b γJ − b γ, the (log) variation of industry wage residuals, b γJ,
about the mean across industries, b γ. Note that this procedure implies that the β vectors are
allowed to vary across years, rather than being constrained to be the same.
In a second step, one regresses the estimated inter-industry wage diﬀerentials on the data
on job ﬂows and other industry characteristics, using
ωJt = α + Y Jβ1 +( YJt − Y J)β2 + νJ + ²Jt
where ωJt is the wage diﬀerential of industry J in year t, YJt is a vector of industry character-
istics, νJ is an industry speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, uncorrelated with the regressors, and ²Jt an i.i.d.
error uncorrelated over time and industry. The Y J are the year means of the YJt. The β1’s
are the between-estimators of the industry eﬀects on wages, whereas the β2’s are the within-
or ﬁxed-eﬀect estimators. The focus here is on β1 only, which gives the partial correlations
across industries between the year averages of wage diﬀerentials and industry characteristics.
Implicitly, it is assumed that the ²Jt average out, which is of course not exactly true because
of the ﬁnite number of industries. When raw wages are used (that is, average earnings per
employee, wJt, from the NBER Productivity database), then ωJt =l nwJt.16
15These variables are: a measure of potential experience, education and its square, 6 age dummies, 8
occupational dummies, 11 region dummies, a sex dummy, 2 race dummies, 4 marital status dummies, ever
married × s e xi n t e r a c t i o n ,e d u c a t i o n× sex interaction, education squared × sex interaction, 6 age × sex
interactions, and a constant. The sample is restricted to full-time employees who are older than 16y e a r s .
Following Katz and Murphy (1992), potential experience is approximated by min(age − years of schooling
−7, age −17).
16The use of cross-sectional data in the presence of heterogeneity and the use of aggregates in micro wage
regression has the pitfall of creating a number of biases. This results from the omission of unobserved worker
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects which could be estimated using matched longitudinal data on both workers and their
respective employers. Without employer information even the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects of workers are biased
(as they include an employment duration weighted average of the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects that a worker enjoyed over
8Results
Figure 1 shows the relationship between excess job reallocation rates and estimated inter-
industry wage diﬀerentials in manufacturing, averaged over 13 years for each industry. The
simple correlation is -.66. (The numbers are the approximate CIC 1980 codes.) Examples for
high-wage, low reallocation sectors are pulp, paper, and paperboard mills (160), petroleum
reﬁning (200), and photographic equipment and supplies (380). Low-wage, high reallocation
sectors are leather products (220), miscellaneous wood products (241), and apparel and
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Figure 1: Inter-industry wage diﬀerentials and excess job reallocation, average by sector
across 1976-1988
To pick one speciﬁc case for a high wage industry with low job ﬂows, take plastics (180).
Wages controlled for individual characteristics are 10.7 percent higher than average in the
manufacturing sector and average excess job reallocation is 6.5 percent. Recall the deﬁnition
of excess job reallocation which implies here that each period only about 3.25 percent of
jobs in that sector vanish, with an equal number newly created, in excess of what is needed
to accommodate net employment growth. Production in that sector is typically capital
his or her career). The use in a wage regression of aggregates such as the average capital-to-labor ratio in an
industry rather than actual capital intensity of an individual ﬁrm obviously leads to a loss of information.
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Abowd and Kramarz (2000) provide a formal illustration of these
biases. See also Moulton (1986). As mentioned in section 2, about half of inter-industry wage diﬀerentials
is likely to arise from person eﬀects, while the rest arises from ﬁrm eﬀects.
17Note that logging (230) has been excluded from the analysis. The nature of that industry suggests that
most of its measured job reallocation is spurious.
9intensive, about half of ﬁrms have more than 500 employees, and proﬁtability is high. At the
other end of the spectrum is apparel (151). Wages are 18.4 percent below the manufacturing
average, and excess job reallocation is 19.5 percent on average. This industry is particularly
labor intensive, only 10 percent of ﬁrms have more than 500 employees, and proﬁtability is
relatively low.
Table 1: Regression of wages on job reallocation measures (between group estimator)
Regression of average wages (1-4) and wage diﬀerentials (5-8) on job ﬂow measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
job creation .0002 -.022
(0.01) (3.22)
job destruction -.055 -.006
(3.10) (1.01)
job reallocation -.028 -.014
(4.64) (5.68)
excess job reallocation -.035 -.035 -.017 -.017
(5.20) (5.49) (6.55) (6.47)
n e te m p l o y m e n tg r o w t h . 0 2 8 . 0 4 2 -.008 -.0008
(1.56) (2.54) (1.32) (0.14)
R2− between .34 .34 .34 .41 .38 .38 .45 .45
# of sectors 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
# of years 16 16 16 16 13 13 13 13
Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parentheses
Table 1 reports the results from regressing wages on measures of job ﬂows. There are two
measures of wages: average (raw) wages in an industry without controlling for worker char-
acteristics (total wage bill divided by employment, columns 1 to 4) and inter-industry wage
diﬀerentials (columns 5 to 8). The coeﬃcients reported are the between-group estimates.
First consider job creation and job destruction rates only. One ﬁnds in column (1) that job
creation is unrelated to average wages, whereas job destruction and wages are signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated. In contrast, controlling for observed worker and job characteristics
in column (5) leaves job destruction insigniﬁcant but reveals an inverse wage-job creation
relationship. The diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients on job creation may indicate a composition
eﬀect in that sectors with relatively high job creation rates employ observedly better worker
and oﬀer better jobs. This eﬀect vanishes in column (5). The negative coeﬃcient on job
creation shows that high job creation sectors (conditional on job destruction) oﬀer lower
rents or employ less able (but unobservedly so) workers. These lower rents may be due to
the fact that the fraction of newly created jobs is high, tenures are lower, so that workers
did not acquire match-speciﬁc capital. The fall in the coeﬃcient on job destruction suggests
that high job destruction sectors (conditional on job creation) tend to employ observedly
10less able workers on worse jobs.
Both job reallocation and excess job reallocation are signiﬁcantly negatively related to
wages. The coeﬃcients on the job ﬂow measures are about 50 percent lower for inter-industry
wage diﬀerentials. This indicates that about half of the between-industry correlation between
job ﬂows and raw wages is due to observed worker and job characteristics that the wage
regression controls for. It also shows that the correlation applies to raw wages and wage
diﬀerentials alike. Taking account of net employment growth has no eﬀect on the relationship
between wages and job ﬂows, as can be seen in columns 3 and 4.18 Interestingly, the positive
coeﬃcient on employment growth becomes insigniﬁcant while job ﬂows become even more
signiﬁcant when wage diﬀerentials are used instead of raw wages. In line with the ﬁnding
for job creation and destruction, sectors that grow faster appear to have workers with better
observable characteristics and to have better job characteristics.
Table 2: Regression of wage diﬀerentials on industry characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
excess job reallocation -.013 -.011 -.015 -.012 -.0047 .0045 -.0037 -.0031
(5.27) (4.29) (5.57) (5.32) (2.02) (1.96) (1.66) (1.50)
capital intensity .07 .39 .31 .46 .36
(0.39) (2.79) (2.16) (3.50) (2.84)
proﬁts-per-employee 1.27 .82 1.05 .31 .53
(2.65) (2.33) (2.86) (0.86) (1.51)
ﬁrm size .22 .26 .23 .22 .18
(4.77) (6.82) (5.87) (5.84) (4.55)
unionization .146 .093 .132
(2.12) (1.83) (2.84)
average education .051 .028 .034
(4.92) (2.99) (3.75)
R2 - between .56 .62 .49 .62 .77 .79 .81 .84
# of sectors 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
# of years 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parentheses
The regressions in Table 2 include various factors that are likely to help account for the
correlation between job ﬂows and wages. Focus here is on excess job reallocation only. This
is because job creation and job destruction rates show no coherent pattern across regressions
and are often insigniﬁcant, net employment growth is insigniﬁcant in almost all speciﬁcations
and does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on excess job reallocation, and, ﬁnally, job reallocation
rates are not considered because excess job reallocation has a clearer interpretation. At this
point be reminded that the regressions are not meant to reﬂect any causality. They report
18T h es a m ei st r u ef o rj o br e a l l o c a t i o n ,n o tr e p o r t e dh e r e .
11partial correlation coeﬃcients between the left-hand side variable and a set of other variables,
and merely help assess the robustness of the partial correlation between wage diﬀerentials
and job ﬂow rates.
In the ﬁrst three columns, four variables are considered: capital intensity, proﬁts-per-
employee, ﬁrm size, and unionization. The positive relationship of each variable with wages
is in line with the previous ﬁndings reported earlier. Capital intensity is likely to be neg-
atively correlated with job ﬂows because of its relationship with entry and other sunk job
creation costs. Similarly, entry barriers that drive down job ﬂows generate market power
for incumbent ﬁrms and thus generate high proﬁts per employee. For ﬁrm size, it is well
known that large ﬁrms exhibit lower job ﬂows, even holding age constant.19 Union cover-
age has been included to reﬂect the possibility that sectors with more stable employment
opportunities and potentially higher attachment between workers and ﬁrms have unionized
workforces.
The most surprising result is that the importance of excess job reallocation is barely
aﬀected when any of the above mentioned variables is included separately.20 The largest
reduction in the coeﬃcient, of about a third, is caused by ﬁrm size. But also here, excess re-
allocation remains highly signiﬁcant. None of the potential explanations works if controlled
for in isolation. However, taking ﬁrm size, capital intensity, and proﬁts-per-employee in con-
junction, the partial correlation between job ﬂows and wage diﬀerentials is sharply reduced.
The coeﬃcient on job ﬂows falls by more than half and comes close to insigniﬁc a n c e( a tt h e5
percent level). The only variable so far not considered is average education of the workforce
in an industry. As mentioned earlier, many studies of the wage structure ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect even though individual workers’ wages have been controlled for the respective worker’s
education. It leads to a fall in the coeﬃcient on job ﬂows and has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
wages. When included along with the other variables, the coeﬃcient on job ﬂows falls to its
lowest level and becomes insigniﬁcant.21 It should be noted that capital intensity and ﬁrm
size alone also reduce the coeﬃcient on job ﬂows (to -.004 with a p-value of 0.106). However,
when proﬁts are included, job ﬂows are signiﬁcant. This indicates some strong collinearities
between proﬁts-per-employee and the other variables.
Similar results obtain when (gross) job reallocation is considered instead of excess job
reallocation. Here, ﬁrm size, capital intensity, and average education are suﬃcient to reduce
the coeﬃcient on job reallocation to statistical and economic insigniﬁcance (0.002 with a
p-value of 0.302). Average education plays a central role in that no other combination of
v a r i a b l e sd e l i v e r st h i se ﬀect. Proﬁts-per-employee have no marginal contribution. Appar-
ently, average education captures most of the contribution of proﬁts, which may arise if ﬁrms
19See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).
20Capital intensity and proﬁts-per-employee are included together mainly to save space.
21Of course, each of the other regressors in column (8), when included last, leaves excess job reallocation
insigniﬁcant. Average education is added last here because it is not among the set of variables that theory
suggests should be related to the wage structure. It is also the least likely to be related to job ﬂows, which
is a surprising ﬁnding. (The correlation between average education and job ﬂows in -0.34.). Furthermore,
in most speciﬁcations, other combinations of three industry characteristics are not suﬃcient to render job
ﬂows low and insigniﬁcant.
12can exploit complementarities between skills that translate into higher proﬁts (and wages).
The empirical analysis suggests that the partial correlation across industries between
job ﬂows and wage diﬀerentials is robust to the inclusion of other industry characteristics
that typically help explain the wage structure. The goal of the next section is to develop a
model with endogenous job ﬂo w st h a ti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e s eﬁndings. An important aspect
of such a model is that it must allow for a mechanism that drives up wages whenever job
reallocation is low, without presupposing such a relationship. Further, this mechanism must
be consistent with the ﬁndings mentioned last, in particular that average education in an
industry seems to play an important role.
4 The model
Firms
An industry contains a continuum of ﬁrms, whose output is sold in a competitive, industry-
wide market. Each ﬁrm consists of one job. Output depends on a worker’s job-speciﬁc
human capital, but the proﬁtability of the job is uncertain in terms of a randomly evolving,
idiosyncratic ﬂow cost, xt. The instantaneous proﬁt ﬂow of a producing ﬁrm is given by22
πJ,t = Pf(h) − xt − wt − k.
where P is the competitive price of the ﬁrm’s output, determined by free entry and taken
as given by ﬁrms. The output of a worker as a function of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital,
f(h), has the properties ∂f/∂h>0a n d∂2f/∂h2 < 0. The wage is wt, determined by Nash
bargaining, and k is a constant maintenance cost, given by k = δK, with depreciation rate
δ and K the capital stock that is necessary for production. Endowing a newly hired worker
with h requires a lump-sum training cost speciﬁed below. Training is employer-provided and
human capital h is constant over the remaining lifetime of the employment relationship. The
job-speciﬁc ﬂow cost evolves stochastically according to the geometric Brownian motion
dxt = µxtdt + σxtdzt,
with drift µ,v a r i a n c eσ2,a n dzt a Wiener process. The realizations of zt are idiosyncratic
to the ﬁrm while the parameters µ and σ are the same for all ﬁrms in a given industry.23
A ﬁrm enters the industry at an exogenously given level of ﬂow costs, xC, normalized to
unity. Upon entry, the ﬁrm pays a lump-sum job creation or entry cost C,a f t e rw h i c hi t
searches for a worker. The job creation cost is the sum of a pure sunk cost, S, and the cost
for the capital stock, K, part of which may be sunk, too. Search is subject to the standard
22Industry subscripts are ignored as long as no confusion arises.
23Even though uncertainty is represented by the random evolution of variable costs, it may be useful to
think of xt more generally as reﬂecting uncertainty in a ﬁrm’s market demand, its productivity, and input
prices. Pissarides (2000) calls xt the variable costs of the ﬁrm. Another plausible formulation would have
been to let revenue be random. However, this leads to the complication that the size of a ﬁrm cannot be
restricted to one.
13matching frictions, represented by a matching function. After a ﬁrm provides training in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, production starts. The wage is determined through Nash bargaining over
the surplus that accrues after training. If the job becomes unproﬁtable, the worker is ﬁred
and the job must be destroyed,24 yielding a scrap value D = κK, with 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
The Bellman equation for the expected present value J of a ﬁlled, producing, job is given
by
rJ(xt,h)=Pf(h) − xt − wt − k + E [dJ(xt,h)]/dt
with r the economy-wide, annual interest rate and E the expectation operator. The equation
has the usual interpretation of relating the return to the asset “job” to a ﬂow dividend per
unit time plus an expected capital gain. The value of a newly created, vacant job at the job
creation threshold xC is similarly given by
rV(xC)=−k + q(θ)[J(xC,h) − V (xC) − T(h)],
where q(θ) is the industry-speciﬁc ﬂow (Poisson) probability of ﬁnding a worker as a function
of labor market tightness θ = v/u (v and u are the measures of vacancies and unemployment
respectively). T(h) is a convex lump-sum training cost. With free entry, the price P and
labor market tightness θ will adjust such that V (xC) − C =0 . The problem of the ﬁrm is
to ﬁnd both a job destruction threshold xD and an optimal level of training that maximizes
the value of a new job, that is,
max
xD,h J(xC,h) − T(h).
The number of matches formed in an industry is a function of the number of vacancies
posted by ﬁrms and the number of searching (unemployed) workers in that industry. There




with 0 <m<1. Industry subscripts are still ignored. The rate at which vacancies are
ﬁlled is M/V =( U/V)m ≡ q(θ)w h e r eθ = V/U. Thus, ∂q(θ)/∂θ < 0. Equivalently, one can
express θ in terms of the vacancy rate v = V/Land the unemployment rate u = U/L, with L
representing the number of workers in a sector (both unemployed and employed). Similarly,
t h er a t ea tw h i c hw o r k e r sﬁnd jobs is M/U =( U/V)m−1 = θq(θ), with ∂θq(θ)/∂θ > 0.
Workers
Risk-neutral workers in the homogeneous workforce search for jobs across industries. Using
t h es a m ei n t e r e s tr a t ea sﬁrms, the value of being unemployed to a worker who searches for
a job in some industry i is given by the arbitrage equation:
rUi = b + θiq(θi)(W
e
i − Ui)( 1 )
24The role of this assumption is discussed at the end of section 5.
14where the ﬂow value of the asset “unemployment” is equated to a ﬂow beneﬁt b (the ﬂow value
of leisure or an unemployment beneﬁt) and an expected capital gain. The latter depends
on the ﬂow probability θiq(θi)o fﬁnding a job times the change in value as a result of being
hired. We
i is the expected value of employment upon being hired in industry i.W o r k e r s
are mobile and join the sectoral unemployment pool that oﬀers the highest expected return,
which implies that U = Ui for all i. However, W e
i and θiq(θi) will depend on each industry’s
structural parameters. The value Wit when employed in industry i is given by:
rWit = wit + E [dWit]/dt
which depends on the wage yet to be determined and the expected change in the value of
employment.
Wage bargaining
Costly search and training generate a surplus over which worker and ﬁrm bargain. Here,
it is assumed that the surplus after training is split in a Nash bargain. However, the ﬁrm
posts the wage before training takes place, and it remains constant at wc over the lifetime
of the job, there is no renegotiation.25 In eﬀect, the ﬁrm correctly anticipates the wage that
would arise in negotiations after training. There is no two-tier wage contract in which the
ﬁrm can extract the cost of training from the worker. More discussion follows below. Nash
bargaining implies
W(xC) − U =
λ
1 − λ
(J(xC) − V (xC))
with the relative bargaining powers λ ∈ [0,1] for the worker and 1 − λ for the ﬁrm. U and
V (xC) are their respective fallback options should the match break up. With the assumed
constant wage, wt = wc, the worker’s Bellman equation becomes
rW(xt)=wc + E [dWt]/dt.
Equilibrium
The job destruction threshold
As in any model with endogenous job destruction, the job destruction threshold, or reserva-
tion cost, xD, is essential for the determination of wages and job ﬂows. It is found with the
help of two optimality conditions that must hold at xD, namely a value matching condition,
J(xD,h) − D =0 , and a smooth pasting condition ∂J(xD,h)/∂xD = 0. These conditions
and a boundary condition for xt → 0 determine the solution to the second-order diﬀerential
25One can show that in this setup, the wage would endogenously remain constant over a large range of
outcomes even if it is not constrained to be constant. This is due to the fact that entry occurs at a level of
cost that is not the lowest possible, so that proﬁts can stochastically increase, rather than only decrease, as
in most other models.
15equation that arises when one uses Ito’s Lemma to substitute E [dJ(xt,h)]/dt in the equa-
tion for J(xt,h) above. The details are given in the Appendix. Solving the value matching











where β > 1 is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic associated with the diﬀerential
equation for J(xt,h). This condition is analogous to the critical investment schedule as found
in, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.145), where the wedge between the critical value
for investment over the sunk cost of investment is β(r−µ)/(β−1). Here, of course, the wedge
is over the net cost of disinvestment, which is the annualized ﬂow return from production
minus the scrap value. The higher this cost, the higher xD and thus the ﬂow cost xt the ﬁrm
is willing to bear before it stops producing.
Since P, h, and wc are endogenous, this equation is not suﬃcient to determine xD.
Conveniently, one can use the free entry condition to eliminate Pf(h)−wc −k. To see this,
remember that, from free entry, V (xC)=C, so that rC = −k + q(θ)[J(xC,h) − C − T(h)]
after substituting into the asset value of a vacant job. Rearranging gives J(xC,h)=C +
[rC + k]/q(θ)+T(h). This can be set equal to the solution of J(xt,h)a txC =1t oy i e l d 26

















Rearranging and inserting into (2) results in an implicit deﬁnition of xD as a function of
structural parameters and the two endogenous variables θ and h:
x
1−β





+ T(h) − D
#
. (3)
Note that an increase in the right hand side leads to an increase in xD. Obviously, it is
increased by higher entry costs C, a lower scrap value D, and higher training costs T.
Furthermore, it is increased by a higher expected forgone output during search for a worker.
Equation (3) is analogous to what Pissarides (2000) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
call the job creation condition.
Job reallocation
Due to the diﬀusion properties assumed for ﬂow costs, one can ﬁnd explicit expressions for
the rate of job destruction, using the associated Fokker-Planck equation. The rate of job



















26J(xC,h)i sg i v e nb y
J(xC,h)=
















−(xD) is the left derivative of the distribution of jobs at xD. O n ec a ns e ef r o mt h e
middle term that the mass of jobs that hit xD depends on the shape of that distribution.
The steeper the distribution, the higher the job ﬂow: a larger mass of ﬁr m si sc l o s et ot h e
threshold, and therefore more likely to hit it, given the drift and variance of the process.
Wages
Since the prospects for an employed worker are governed by the geometric Brownian mo-
tion for xt deﬁned above, Ito’s Lemma applies here as well, and can be used to determine
E [dWt]/dt in the wage equation. Again, this results in a second-order diﬀerential equation,
which can be solved using the appropriate boundary conditions. The boundary condition at
the point where a match breaks up, rW(xD)=rU, implies that one can rewrite the solved




t . Bargaining takes place at xt = xC =1 ,













It remains to determine W(xC). Using the fact that J(xC,h)−V (xC)=J(xC,h)−C =










so that substituting into the wage yields













This equation shows the main intuition of the model. Ceteris paribus, a higher xD implies
a lower wage. This is because of compensating diﬀerentials for a higher expected duration
of the job. On the other hand, higher job creation costs C,h i g h e rﬂow cost of capital k, or
a higher expected vacancy duration 1/q(θ)l e a dt oah i g h e rw a g e .T h i sr e ﬂects the forgone
revenue the ﬁrm suﬀers if the match broke up, increasing the bargaining position of the
worker. Of course, higher job creation costs also aﬀect the destruction threshold, and the
resulting increase in the duration of the job depresses the wage. It also creates an incentive
for the ﬁrm to invest in training h.
There are a few important diﬀerences to the setup in other search and matching models,
such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). First, the job creation cost is paid before the match
forms. One should think of ﬁrms incurring most of the sunk creation cost (administration,
research and development, planning and construction of a plant) in advance. Thus, the full
value of C does not appear in the wage equation, which would be the case if creation cost
were paid ex-post. However, rC appears because it reﬂects the forgone revenue if the ﬁrm
needed to replace the worker. Secondly, the model imposes a one-tier wage structure. That
is, workers do not pay for the subsequently earned rents by accepting a low starting wage.
Instead, a uniform “insider” wage is paid, for the same reasons provided by Mortensen and
17Pissarides (1999): Once hired, workers have an incentive to renege on the lower initial wage,
so a hold-up problem arises. Third, there is a direct eﬀect of the perceived security of the
job on the wage, reﬂected by xD.
Training
The choice of training has two eﬀects on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. Proﬁtability and training
costs are directly aﬀected. But the increase in productivity also aﬀects the job destruction
threshold by making the ﬁrm more reluctant to destroy the more valuable job that carries a
more valuable match. The ﬁrm chooses training to maximize (using the fact that xC =1 ) :
J(xC,h) − T(h)=






































where the latter follows from the job destruction condition (2). Note that there is no eﬀect of
xD on the wage because the wage is already negotiated when the ﬁrm provides training. This
level of training, however, is correctly anticipated when the wage is set. However, training










This condition shows directly the role of xD for the training choice: the higher expected
duration of the job that comes with a higher xD increases the marginal return to training.
One-sector general equilibrium
Before analysing the inter-industry structure of wages, one needs to determine the over-
all value of unemployment in the average industry. For the time being, ignore the en-
dogeneity of training costs, and write T instead of T(h)a n df instead of f(h). Using
the bargaining equation, the Bellman equation for unemployed workers can be rewritten:
rU = b+ θq(θ)(We − U)=b +θq(θ) λ
1−λ ((rC + k)/q(θ)+T). Inserting into the wage equa-
tion gives the equilibrium wage















A second equation for the wage comes from the job destruction condition (2). Solving it for






















This gives a mildly downward-sloping curve in (xD,θ)-space, whereas the job creation con-
dition (3) implies an upward-sloping curve.
185 Calibration and simulation
This section discusses the parameter values and the benchmark general equilibrium around
which the industry simulations take place. Some of the numerical values that are used
as benchmarks for each parameter will remain constant in all simulations; others will be
varied to reﬂect certain dimensions of industry heterogeneity. The time period is one year.
The common interest rate for ﬁrms and workers is r =0 .05. Capital depreciates at a rate
κ =0 .1. Following convention, the bargaining share of workers is set to λ =0 .5a n dt h e
unemployment beneﬁti ss e tt ob =0 .
The levels of certain parameters are only deﬁned relative to other variables. The initial
values for capital, wages, and job destruction in the benchmark industry were chosen as
follows. The starting value for capital-per-worker is normalized to K =0 .6, which may be
interpreted as 60,000 (1987) dollars per worker, roughly the average for the manufacturing
sector. By the one job-one worker assumption, K is equivalent to the capital intensity. The
scrap value is set to D =0 .9K. Revenue is normalized to Pf(h)=4 . Productivity of a
worker is given by f(h)=g + h1−d/(1 − d)w i t hd =0 .4, g =1 0 . The latter reﬂects general
human capital of workers. Training costs are given by T(h)=th.
The stochastic process for the ﬂow cost xt is assumed to have drift µ =0 .04 and standard
deviation σ =0 .05. This implies a drift for the logarithm of xt (or the percentage change) of
ν = µ − 1/2σ2. For a stationary distribution to obtain in steady state, ν must be positive,
a n di nt h i sc a s ei sν =0 .025, reﬂecting the fact that existing ﬁrms’ conditions tend to
worsen in the long run. A reason for this can be that the technology of new ﬁrms increases
while existing ﬁrms fall behind. One could model this explicitly by letting the entry of new,
productive ﬁrms drive down the price, so that proﬁts fall. Instead, the shortcut was taken to
let costs move up.27 The table summarizes the assumptions along with the range of values
for wages and job ﬂows that the simulations aim to replicate.
The general equilibrium of this economy can be found numerically using equations (3) and
(6). Training is taken as given for the average industry and the training cost is normalized
to equal 10 percent of yearly revenue. The solution is a pair of labor market tightness and
the job destruction threshold as functions of the underlying parameters. From this, one
can calculate the wage and the job destruction rate. For the benchmark calibration, the
equilibrium values are θ∗ =4 .5a n dx∗
D =1 .46, which corresponds to a job destruction rate
of 9.3 percent. The equilibrium wage is w∗ =2 .8.
Inter-industry wage diﬀerentials and job ﬂows
Simulating the industry structure of job ﬂows and wages requires a change in perspective.
Variables that are endogenous in general equilibrium are parameters for the industry equi-
librium. Diﬀerences in the structural parameters of an industry, such as job creation costs,
leave the value of searching (being unemployed) in that sector unaﬀected, even if there are
27For an example of an explicit solution, see Krieger (1998). He normalizes his equation system by a
dynamic scale factor, so that a stationary optimization problem obtains.
19Table 3: Parameter calibration and starting values
Idiosyncratic uncertainty σ =0 .1,µ=0 .04, ν =0 .025
Interest rate r =0 .05
Productivity f(h)=g + h1−d/(1 − d)
General human capital g =1 0
Training cost T(h)=th
Depreciation rate κ =0 .1
Bargaining share λ =0 .5
Benchmark capital per job K = C = .6
Range for job creation cost per job C ∈ [0.6,2.2]
Scrap value D =0 .9K
Average job destruction rate JD =9 .7
Target range for job destruction JD ∈ [6.5,13.3]
Target range for wages w ∈ [0.8w∗,1.2w∗]
Revenue Pf(h)=4
Matching function m =0 .5
eﬀects on the value of being employed. Again, this is due to the mobility of workers that
equalizes returns to search across sectors. What does adjust, however, is the mass of workers
relative to the mass of vacancies in a sector, and that in turn aﬀe c t sl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t -
ness. Given labor market tightness and the other structural parameters, one can calculate
the resulting industry job ﬂows and wages. This section proceeds by ﬁrst analysing the case
without endogenous training to illustrate the workings of the model more clearly, and to show
the diﬃculty to explain high wages in low job ﬂow industries when training investments are
absent. Then, endogenous training investments are included.
No training
The core equations determining the equilibrium in an industry are (1) and (4), replicated
here for convenience, using industry subscripts:
rU = b + θiq(θi)(W
e
i − U)









i = Wi(xC)a n dT(hi)=T in all industries. Given the uniform level of training,
these equations uniquely determine the value of ﬁnding employment in an industry, W e
i ,a n d
the corresponding labor market tightness, θi. Given θi, one can obtain xD,i using equation
(3) and ﬁnally wc,i by (5). Note that when deep parameters change, the value of a job is
aﬀected, which in turn encourages entry or exit and thus a corresponding price change. The
condition that determines xD,i already incorporates this fact.
20In the simulation, the sunk cost of job creation is varied by as much as is necessary
to generate the range of job reallocation rates observed in the U.S. manufacturing sector,
w h i c hi nt h i sc a s ei sf r o mC =0 .6t oC =2 .2. Capital K is held constant which reﬂects
that capital has been controlled for in the regression of wage diﬀerentials on job ﬂows. The
result is shown in Figure 2.
The graph shows a positive correlation between job ﬂows and wages. Note that because
of the steady state of the model, job reallocation and excess job reallocation are the same
in the model. The wage is depicted in a range of 5 percent below and above the average
wage, which indicates that the predicted variation of the wage is very low compared to the
empirical range. However, the central result is that the correlation is positive, in contrast
to the data. The variation in wages and job ﬂows is due only to the variation in sunk job
creation cost.
The intuition for this lies in the compensating diﬀerentials that ﬁrms have to oﬀer in
the presence of higher unemployment risk. High job creation costs in an industry increase
the expected duration of a job which induces workers to accept a lower wage. Several
simultaneous eﬀects take place. Higher job creation costs aﬀect the wage directly through a
stronger bargaining position of the worker, reﬂected by the term rC i nt h ew a g ee q u a t i o n .
Against this works an increase in labor market tightness for workers because less jobs are
created, which strengthens ﬁrms’ bargaining position. The overall eﬀect on (rC +k)/q(θ)i s
positive. Nevertheless, the fall in job reallocation and thus rise in job duration, due to the
21increase in xD, l e a d st oad e c l i n ei n1 /(1−x
−β
D ), reﬂecting workers’ willingness to accept lower
wages. Since the wage falls with falling job ﬂows, the latter eﬀect outweighs the increase in
(rC + k)/q(θ) in the wage equation (5).
Two types of general equilibrium eﬀects are at work. One is the adjustment of prices.
Rising job creation costs reduce entry into an industry and thus drive up the industry price.
This in turn makes ﬁrms more reluctant to destroy jobs, as can be seen in (2). The other
eﬀect is on labor market tightness. A reduced creation of jobs reduces the likelihood of
workers ﬁnding a job in an industry, thus weakening their bargaining position.
Training
The inclusion of training investments requires a parametrization of the training function and
the cost of training. The parameters chosen here are d =0 .4a n dg =1 0 . The factor t in
the training cost function is actually not chosen ex-ante, but the result of the calibration of
the general equilibrium version of the model, which required total training cost to equal 10
percent of yearly revenue. Thus, t turned out to equal 5.9. For the industry equilibrium,
this and the value of unemployment are treated as parameters. Varying job creation costs
in the same range as above results in Figure 3.
When allowing ﬁrms to invest in their workers’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, the predicted corre-
lation between job ﬂows and wages is negative as found in the data. Higher training in
22industries with higher job creation costs oﬀsets the negative eﬀect that higher job security
has on the wage. Technically, the increase in T(h) outweighs the fall of 1/(1 − x
−β
D )i nt h e
wage equation. Through bargaining, a worker can extract part of the replacement costs that
the ﬁrm would incur if the match broke up. Workers in such industries not only enjoy the
beneﬁts of higher job security, but also obtain higher rents from training. In this ﬁgure, the
range for wages depicted is that found for wage diﬀerentials in the data (20 percent above
and below the average). The model’s predicted range for wages (about 5 percent below and
above the average) roughly corresponds to the empirical range found after controlling for
industry characteristics. Another interaction that takes place is an increase in training that
further raises the job destruction threshold, which aﬀects job duration and in turn feeds back
into training. Additionally, since higher job creation costs reduce entry, the higher industry
price increases the marginal return to training.
Another important possibility is that industries diﬀer by skill requirements. This is
obvious for capital-intensive industries, where workers may have to learn how to operate
sophisticated machinery. An independent variation of skill requirements can be modelled by
varying the parameter of the training function, d. A higher return from training increases
training and therefore workers’ wages. For ﬁrms, higher training costs increase the job
destruction threshold and thus reduce the job destruction rate. Furthermore, higher wages
attract more workers into such a sector, so that labor market tightness (for ﬁrms) falls. The
range of wages generated by industry diﬀerences in skill requirements is not reported here
but is similar in magnitude and sign to that arising from diﬀerences in sunk job creation
costs.
Variation in the bargaining power of the worker leads to a positive correlation between
wages and job destruction. A higher wage results if the worker obtains a larger share of
the joint surplus of the match with the ﬁrm. Furthermore, a lower expected duration of the
job must be compensated with a higher wage. For the ﬁrm, the fact that a larger fraction
of the surplus goes to the worker reduces the incentive to train so that training falls. Job
destruction rises both from the fall in training and from the fall in labor market tightness
that results from the increased attractiveness of jobs. Note that this is a partial equilibrium
result where the outside option of the worker is constant and equal to the economywide value
of being unemployed. In general equilibrium, increased bargaining power for workers would
decrease the value of being unemployed because of a fall in vacancies relative to searching
workers.28
Robustness
The model takes several shortcuts to facilitate the analysis and exposition, which might
not be innocuous. Wages are assumed to be constant over all possible realizations of xt.
Typically, one would assume that wages change with ﬂow costs, along with the proﬁtability
of a job. However, this is not generally the case if costs can move below the level at which
jobs are created. One can show that there exists a notional cost level, call it xH, with
28No clear predictions arise from variation in the drift or variance in the process for ﬂow costs.
23xH >x C, above which ﬁrms’ value of a vacancy is zero (or equal to the scrap value D).
Costs are then so high that if bargaining broke down, ﬁrms would not replace a worker, but
rather destroy the job. Hiring costs are not expected to be amortized. Between xH and the
job destruction threshold xD,t h eﬁrms surplus, and thus the surplus of the match, would
depend on xt. Correspondingly, wages vary. In contrast, for ﬂow costs below xH,t h es u r p l u s
of the ﬁrm is given by J(xt) − V (xt)=[ rC + k]/q(θ)+T(h), the replacement cost. This is
constant if training is the same for all hires. If training varies depending on the expected
duration of the job, lower ﬂows costs would to some extent translate into wages. But the
v a r i a t i o ni nw a g e sw o u l db em u c hl o w e rt h a nt h a to fﬂow costs. Since most workers would
fall into this range of relatively invariant or even constant wages, the assumption of wages
that are relatively constant is not as restrictive as it might seem.29
The model imposes equality of the thresholds where a worker is ﬁred and the job is
destroyed. It may well be that a ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to ﬁre a worker while keeping the
job idle until costs (or generally market conditions) improve. At some point, it would try to
ﬁll the job again and resume production once a worker is found. Firing and job destruction
thresholds would coincide only if costs of ﬁring or the scrap value are high enough. The
separation of these thresholds has an interesting implication for the sensitivity of job ﬂows
to variation in skill requirements. In contrast to the setup analysed here, exogenous training
diﬀerences would indeed aﬀect wages, but only slightly aﬀect job ﬂows. The reason is that
the critical threshold for job destruction is barely aﬀected by diﬀerences in training costs,
which are match-related by not job-related. This casts doubt on an explanation of the
relationship between wages and job ﬂows in which higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital creates
long-run attachments between workers and ﬁrms, which drives down job ﬂows (see Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996). With a separation of job destruction and ﬁring, mainly
worker ﬂows would be aﬀected.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper establishes a negative correlation between job ﬂows and wage diﬀerentials across
3-digit U.S. manufacturing sectors. The empirical analysis shows that the correlation is
not accounted for by industry characteristics that typically help explain the industry wage
structure. However, jointly including ﬁrm size, capital-per-employee, and average education
of the workforce in an industry renders the coeﬃcient on job ﬂows small and insigniﬁcant.
The labor market model developed to explain these ﬁndings features ex-ante job creation
costs and endogenous training along with search and matching and endogenous job ﬂows.
The ex-ante nature of job creation costs allows to analyse the eﬀects of job duration on
wages. If these costs were ex-post, as in other search and matching models, they would
by assumption be on the bargaining table and thus directly aﬀect wages. Here, the eﬀect
is only indirect through job duration, which is inversely related to job reallocation rates.
In the model with endogenous training, the industry structure of wages and job ﬂows can
29Formal derivation of this argument is available from the author upon request.
24be explained by the fact that training responds to the diﬀerences in job duration that job
creation costs bring about. One can think of factors that potentially amplify the response
of wages to diﬀerences in job ﬂows. For example, once workers are more productive through
training, and thus more costly to replace, ﬁrms have an incentive to reduce costly turnover
by oﬀering higher wages.
How does this help interpreting the empirical ﬁndings? The role of job duration is most
clearly understood for ﬁrm size. As reported in the introduction, Idson (1996) interprets
his ﬁndings on the employer size wage eﬀect by investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc motivated by
the security of long-run attachments that large employers can provide. It appears that the
ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect is an important factor in the industry structure of job ﬂows and wages.
While ﬁrm size plays no direct role in the model presented here, it also implies a causation
from job duration to training and thus wages.
Capital intensity is likely to reﬂect the skill requirements for workers to operate complex
machinery. In the model, this would be reﬂe c t e db ya ne x o g e n o u sv a r i a t i o ni nt r a i n i n g ,
rather than the endogenous variation due to diﬀerences in expected job duration. To the
extent that the regressions control for capital-per-employee, the analysis suggests that the
remaining correlation between job ﬂo w sa n dw a g e sa r i s e sf r o mt h ed u r a t i o ne ﬀect.
The role of average education in the wage regression can be interpreted as outlined in
the introduction. If there are complementarities between skills and training, as in Neal
(1998) then industries that require training will attract more able workers. The coeﬃcient
on average education would then proxy for the training provided in high wage industries.
This is in line with the ﬁnding by Black and Lynch (1995) mentioned in the introduction
that “employers who have hired workers with higher average education are more likely to
train workers within their establishments.”
Other eﬀects are possible however. If there are skill complementarities between workers,
then workers will be more productive in industries that employ better workers.30 Even if
there are no training investments, more stable industries will attract these better workers,
and thus be able to enjoy these complementarities. An evaluation of this possibility is left
to future research.
Appendix
A Solution of the diﬀerential equations
The expectational term in the Bellman equation for an active ﬁrm can be expressed as
E [dJt]/dt = E [dJ(xt,h)]/dt = µxt∂J(xt,h)/∂xt + 1
2σ2x2
t∂2J(xt,h)/∂x2
t, by Ito’s Lemma.
Inserting and solving the resulting diﬀerential equations gives31
J(xt,h)=











31See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
25where −α < 0a n dβ > 0 are the roots of the fundamental quadratic 1
2σ2γ(γ − 1) + µγ − r
associated with the diﬀerential equation and AJ and BJ are the constants of integration.
Note that for the positive root (β > 1), ∂β/∂σ < 0. The negative root can be eliminated by
the boundary condition that J(xt,h)c a n n o tg ot oi n ﬁnity for xt → 0s ot h a tAJ =0 . To
determine BJ, one uses the optimality conditions that must hold at xD. The value matching
condition is J(xD,h)−D =0 , and the smooth pasting condition is ∂J(xD,h)/∂xD =0 . This
gives −1/(r − µ)+βBJx
β−1
D =0 . Solve for BJ and insert into the value matching condition
to get







xD − D =0 .
This equation can be rearranged to get xD as given in the text.
Similarly, one ﬁnds the solution of the wage equation, where E [dWt]/dt = E [dW(xt)]/dt =
µxtW0(xt)+1
2σ2x2









with the same roots as above. The constant of integration Aw can be eliminated by the same
argument as before. Since the employment relationship ends when the job is destroyed, the
value of employment must equal that of unemployment when xt = xD. Hence, W(xD)=
wc/r + Bwx
β
D = U or Bw =( U − wc/r)x
−β















which can be rearranged to get the equation in the text.
B Data construction
Job creation and destruction
The job ﬂow measures used in this study are taken from the data provided by the Center
of Economic Studies at the U.S. Bureau of the Census. They can be downloaded from the
website http://www.ces.usbc.gov. More details can be found in Davis, Haltiwanger, and
Schuh (1996). They follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) and deﬁne job destruction and job











where Xsit is employment at establishment i in industry s at point in time t, and Zst =
0.5(Xst + Xst−1).N s denotes the number of ﬁrms in sector s. The ﬁrst sum includes all
positive changes whereas the second includes all reductions in employment. Net employment
changes in a sector are simply given by NETst = JCst − JDst. One can summarize the
degree of turbulence in a sector by job reallocation (JR), which is the sum of destruction
and creation. Excess job reallocation is a measure of the degree of job reallocation that goes
beyond the amount necessary to accommodate net employment changes and is deﬁned as
XJRst = JRst − |NETst|.
26Proﬁts-per-employee
The computation of proﬁts-per-employee follows a procedure suggested by Sanfey (1992)
a n du s e db yB l a n c h ﬂower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1996). They use the following formula,
employing data from the NBER Productivity Database by Eric Bartelsman and Wayne
Gray (see www.nber.org).
π =
value added − payroll
CPI
− real depreciation − opportunity cost of capital
with
real depreciation = capitalt − capitalt+1 + investmentt,
opportunity cost of capital = real interest rate × real capital stock.
The real interest rate was taken to be the T-bill rate minus the inﬂation rate, and CPI is the
consumer price index with the base year of the real variables, 1987. The CPI is contained
in the March Files or can be taken with the T-bill rate from the International Financial
Statistics of the IMF, for example.
Classiﬁcation of industries
Note that most manufacturing industry codes (MIC) correspond to the CIC (1980) classiﬁ-
cation used for the Current Population survey up to 1992. Some industries had to be merged
because they consisted of too few measurements in the wage data. All industries with less
than twenty observations were merged to the next closest industry, so that no industry wage
diﬀerential in any year has been estimated with less than 40 observations.
27MIC CIC70 Description SIC (1972)
(CIC80)
100 268 Meat products 201
101 269 Dairy products 202
102 278 Canned foods 203
110 279 Grain mill prod. 204
111 287 Bakery prod. 205
112 288 Confectionery 206
120 289 Beverage ind. 208
121 297 Misc. food 207,209
130 299 Tobacco 211-214
132 307 Knitting mills 225
140 308 Dying & ﬁnishing textiles, exc. wool & knit goods 226
140/141 309 Floor coverings, exc. hard surface 227
142 317 Yarn, thread, and fabric mills 221-224,228
140/150 318 Misc. textile mill products 229
151 319 Apparel and accessories 231-238
152 327 Misc. fabricated textile products 239
160 328 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 261-263,266
161 329 Misc. paper and pulp products 264,267
162 337 Paperboard containers and boxes 265
171 338 Newspaper publishing and printing 271
172 339 Printing, publishing, & allied ind., exc. 338 272-279
180 348,349 Plastics, synthetics, and resins; synthetic ﬁbers 282
181 357 Drugs and medicines 283
182 358 Soaps and cosmetics 284
190 359 Paints, vanishes, and related products 285
191 367 Agricultural chemicals 287
192 347,368 Industrial chemicals; misc. chemicals 281,286,289
200 377 Petroleum reﬁning 291
28MIC CIC70 Description SIC (1972)
(CIC80)
200/201 378 Misc. petroleum and coal products 295,299
211 379 Rubber products 301-306
212 387 Misc. plastic products 307,308
220 388 Tanned, curried, and ﬁnished leather 311
220/221 389 Footwear, except rubber 313,314
220/222 397 Leather products, exc. footwear 312,315-317,319
230 107 Logging 241
231 108 Sawmills, planing mills, and mill work 242,243
241 109 Misc. wood products 244,245,249
242 118 Furniture and ﬁxtures 251-259
250 119 Glass and glass products 321-323
251 127 Cement, concrete, gypsum, and plaster products 324,327
262/252 128 Structural clay products 325
262/261 137 Pottery and related products 326
262 138 Misc. nonmetallic mineral and stone products 328,329
280 139,147-149 Metal industries (Steel, iron, aluminum, other) 331-339
281 157 Cutlery, handtools, and other handware 342
282 158 Fabricated structural metal products 344
290 159 Screw machine products; 345
290/291 167 Metal stamping 346
300 168,258 Misc. fabricated metal prod.; ordnance 341,343,347-349
301
310 177 Engines and turbines 351
311 178 Farm machinery and equipment 352
312 179 Construction and material handling machines 353
320 187 Metalworking machines 354
331 188,189,197 Oﬃce & accounting; elec. computing; machines 355-359
340 199 Household appliances 363
341 207 Radio, TV, and communication equipment 365,366
342 208 Electrical machine, equipment, and supplies, n.e.c. 361,362,364,367,369
351 219 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 371
352 227 Aircraft and parts 372,352
360 228 Ship and boat building and repairing 373
360/361 229 Railroad locomotives and equipment 374
370 238 Cycles and misc. transportation equipment 375,3799
370 237 Mobile dwellings and campers 3791
371 239 Scientiﬁc and controlling instruments 381,382
371 247 Optical and health services supplies
380 248 Photographic equipment and supplies; 386
380/381 249 Watches, clocks, and related devices 387
391 259 Misc. manufacturing industries 391-399
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